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The 1952 Steel Seizure 
Revisited: A Systematic 
Study in Presidential 
Decision Making 
Chong-do Hah and 
Robert M. Lindquist 
There is a paucity of conceptual approaches to and sys- 
tematic case studies of presidential decision making, 
especially in the area of domestic policy. The three mod- 
els advanced by Graham T. Allison in Essence of Decision 
are applied to the 1952 steel seizure to explain why Presi- 
dent Truman decided to seize the mills. In the first model 
analysis, the steel seizure is explained as the action that 
maximized Truman's goal of maintaining steel produc- 
tion. In the second, it is interpreted in part as the result of 
the actions of governmental organizations that dealt with 
the dispute. In the third, it is explained as a makeshift 
compromise concocted under the pressure of an ap- 
proaching strike deadline. The Allison approach has some 
weaknesses, but is found to be useful for explaining pres- 
idential decisions. The limitations of presidential power in 
domestic decision making are noted.' 
The president of the United States has been called the most 
powerful person in the world. An individual in that position 
can destroy life on earth at the touch of a button. The presi- 
dent's decisions often affect all parts of the globe. As Harry 
Truman once said, "The Presidency of the United States of 
America has become the greatest and most important office 
in the history of the world" (Koenig, 1964:7). There is, how- 
ever, a lack of systematic studies explaining presidential deci- 
sions. Most studies of the president have been idiosyncratic 
biographies or, on occasion, indepth personality portraits, 
such as Burns's (1956) Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox or the 
Georges' (1956) Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Per- 
sonality Study. A more recent attempt to provide a 
psychoanalytical framework for analyzing presidents was 
Barber's (1972) The Presidential Character. Predicting Per- 
formance in the White House. 2 Legalistic treatises on the 
powers and duties of the president have also been common, 
Corwin's (1 957) The President: Office and Power perhaps 
being the most notable. Neustadt's (1960) Presidential Pow- 
er: The Politics of Leadership remains, of course, the classic 
work on the nature of presidential power. 
The only attempt to formulate a coherent framework for 
analyzing presidential decisions alone was Sorenson's (1 963) 
Decision Making in the White House. Sorenson delineated a 
number of limitations that restrict presidential options and 
specified the major forces affecting the context in which 
presidential decisions are made. In addition, he described an 
ideal eight-step process of presidential decision making. 
The only existing case studies of presidential decisions, such 
as Paige's (1968) The Korean Decision or Allison's (1 97 1) 
Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
dealt solely with foreign policy decisions. There are no de- 
tailed, systematic explanations of presidential decisions in 
domestic affairs. This study fills that gap by analyzing Tru- 
man's decision to seize the steel mills, answering the ques- 
tion why, not how. The framework of analysis used is the 
series of conceptual models developed by Allison in Essence 
of Decision, namely, Model 1, Model 11, and Model 111.3 Allison, 
however, did not claim that his models are models in the 
strict sense of the term, but only loose conceptual 
frameworks. 
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THE MODELS 
Allison's Model I takes as its basic unit of analysis gov- 
ernmental action as rational choice. The government be- 
comes a single analytic entity with its own set of goals, 
values, and objectives. Governmental action is merely their 
maximization. The process of explanation involves the follow- 
ing inference pattern: given a governmental action, there 
must have been a national goal or objective which the action 
was intended to achieve. The method of explanation is a form 
of vicarious problem solving in which analysts put themselves 
in the place of the government and derive the correct goals, 
alternatives, and consequences. Why did the United States 
impose a blockade on Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis? 
Because it was the most rational way of getting the Russians 
to remove the missiles. In Essence of Decision, the unitary 
actor is the government. In this study, the rational unitary 
actor is the president. 
In Model 11 the focus is on the inputs and outputs of govern- 
ment organizations, with the basic unit of analysis being gov- 
ernmental action as organizational output. Leaders may de- 
cide, but the information upon which they make their deci- 
sions is generated by, and their decisions are implemented 
through, a set of governmental organizations. To explain gov- 
ernmental action at a certain time (t), the analyst should 
examine the organizations comprising the government and 
their routines, programs, repertoires, and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) at time (t-1). The best prediction of the 
action of governmental organizations at time (t+1) becomes 
their routines, programs, repertoires, and SOPs at (t). The 
Model 11 explanation of the United States blockade of Cuba in 
1962, for example, focuses on the routines and processes of 
such American government organizations as the Central Intel- 
ligence Agency and the navy. 
In Model Ill government decisions are not rational choices but 
the result of the struggle between different actors in the 
government who have various preferences and values and 
varying degrees of power and competence. The basic unit of 
analysis is governmental action as political resultant. To ex- 
plain a decision, the Model Ill analyst recounts the game be- 
tween the decision-making actors that resulted in the action 
in question; such a game consists of the action channel-a 
programmed means of governmental action on a specific 
issue-the players and their positions and preferences, and 
the bargaining. Thus, in Model Ill terms, the decision to im- 
pose a blockade upon Cuba in 1962 is explained as the result 
of bargaining among members of the White House Executive 
Committee (ExCom). 
STEEL SEIZURE BACKGROUND 
The 1952 steel seizure was a significant event in the history 
of the presidency. It was one of the strongest assertions of 
the preeminence of presidential authority and the decision of 
the Supreme Court invalidating the seizure was, as Rexford 
Tugwell put, "perhaps the most serious setback the Presi- 
dency has ever suffered" (Bernstein, 1 967: 273). 
McConnell (1960) provided a comprehensive documentary 
account of many of the events leading up to the seizure in his 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
The Steel Seizure of 1952. Enarson (1955), a White House 
staff member at the time of the dispute, recounted the poli- 
tics of the steel seizure in his "The Politics of an Emergency 
Dispute." Neustadt (1960), also a White House aide during 
those months, summarized the events in Presidential Power, 
analyzing them in terms of his conception of the nature of 
presidential power. Stebbins (1971), in "Truman and the Sei- 
zure of Steel: A Failure in Communication," analyzed Tru- 
man's failure to win public opinion to his side during the 
dispute. The legal implications of the steel seizure case and of 
the various battles in the district court, appeals court, and 
Supreme Court have been adequately handled by Westin 
(1958) in The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case, Bradford 
(1967) in The Steel Seizure Case, and countless articles in law 
journals. This study synthesizes elements of all these works 
to explain systematically the seizure decision. 
The 1952 steel dispute had its roots in Truman's partial 
mobilization for the Korean War. After the North Korean at- 
tack on June 25, 1 950, Truman instituted a program of partial 
rearmament. Draft calls were increased, several reserve divi- 
sions were activated, and the defense budget was nearly 
doubled, rising from 8 percent of the GNP to 14 percent. In 
the Defense Production Act of July 1950, Truman received 
authority to set military priorities on the production of certain 
items essential to the war effort and control wages and 
prices. On September 8, he issued Executive Order 101 61, 
establishing the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA) with 
statutory authority to administer wage and price controls. 
Actual control over wages and prices, however, was given to 
a subordinate Wage Stabilization Board (WSB), composed of 
a nine-member executive with equal representation from 
labor, management, and the public. Though the ESA theoret- 
ically had to approve requests for wage hikes, in actuality it 
only rubber-stamped WSB recommendations. To help 
strengthen the price stabilization program, the administration 
created a separate agency in November 1950, the Office of 
Price Stabilization (OPS), to administer price ceilings. 
The Chinese surprise attack on November 28, 1950 led to an 
intensification of the mobilization program. Truman declared a 
state of emergency on December 1 5, 1950, and the next day 
established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which 
had authority over production controls and the economic 
stabilization machinery. Its first head, Charles E. Wilson, was 
made chief of the whole mobilization effort, the most sweep- 
ing delegation of presidential authority up to that time. 
The Korean War touched off a consumer spending spree that 
was only intensified by the Chinese intervention in 
November. By January 1 951, the consumer price index had 
risen 1 0.3 points from the period just before the Korean 
outbreak. In an attempt to bring a halt to the runaway infla- 
tion, Truman ordered a general wage-price freeze on January 
26, 1951. 
The economic stabilization machinery administering wage and 
price controls functioned effectively throughout 1 951. A po- 
tential source of trouble arose, however, when the United 
Steelworkers of America passed resolutions demanding large 
wage increases. The cost of living had risen significantly since 
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the last settlement and the union felt that its wage rates were 
lagging behind those that had been awarded to other big 
unions. The steelworkers union and the steel companies 
began holding contract talks on November 26, 1951, but the 
talks ground to a halt two weeks later. The industry stalled on 
presenting its wage offer to the union because it first wanted 
assurances of a compensatory price increase from the gov- 
ernment, assurances it was not receiving. In spite of the 
efforts of federal mediators, the union and company negotia- 
tions were not nearing a settlement and a strike on De- 
cember 31, 1951 appeared inevitable. Truman thereupon cer- 
tified the steel dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board, on 
December 24, 1951, which was to study the dispute and 
recommend terms for settlement. The union agreed to post- 
pone its strike. 
On March 20, 1952, the WSB announced its recommenda- 
tions, calling for a 1 2Y2 cents raise effective January 1, 1952 
and the introduction of the union shop. The union accepted 
the terms, but the companies declared that the recom- 
mended wage increase could be financed only by a large 
increase in prices, on the order of $7.00 a ton. The OPS 
refused to grant such an increase and the industry then re- 
fused to come to terms with the union. The union's strike 
deadline was set for April 8. 
THE RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH 
The impending strike posed the problem to Truman of how to 
maintain steel production. Not only was he vitally interested 
in the maintenance of steel production, he was keenly aware 
of the critical demand for steel due to the Korean conflict in 
particular and the need to increase the United States's mili- 
tary capability and industrial-economic strength in general. 
Controls had been placed on the production and allocation of 
steel since the fall of 1950. Even so, the American army in 
Korea had suffered shortages of ammunition. In June 1951, 
General Van Fleet, the American commander, had to impose 
rationing of ammunition, thus slowing American advances in 
some areas. As Truman observed in December of that year: 
It is of the utmost importance to prevent an interruption in the production of 
steel Steel is a key material in our entire defense effort Each day of steel 
production lost is a day lost forever in the achievement of our production 
schedule. Continuous production of this industry is essential in order to meet 
urgent demands for steel-steel for weapons, for factories, for highways, 
and hospitals and schools (1 965: 651). 
Under Truman's direction, the United States had embarked 
on a vigorous global foreign policy for the first time in its 
history. During his term in office, he had had to cope with a 
series of Soviet-generated crises over such places as Turkey, 
Czechoslovakia, and Berlin. His concern over Soviet designs 
for world domination was heightened by the Korean War. As 
Brown (1968) noted, the "overriding fear in the White House 
was not simply that the loss of the Korean peninsula would 
encourage the Soviets to embark on further aggressions. 
Rather, it was that the Soviets were embarked, now, on 
some pattern of military aggression. . ." and that "a number 
of small territorial grabs could add up to a critical alteration of 
the global balance" of power. To increase American power, 
Truman had instituted a general rearmament program of re- 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
plenishing the military strength that had declined since World 
War 11 and had increased supplies of military goods to Ameri- 
ca's allies. Thus, a loss of steel production would weaken the 
basis of power upon which America's foreign policy rested. 
As McConnell (1960: 32) pointed out, Truman had four op- 
tions to prevent a stoppage of steel: (1) seize the mills under 
Section 18 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act 
of 1948, which authorized the president to place orders with 
any plant capable of producing materials for the armed forces 
and to seize them if those orders were not filled; (2) seize the 
mills under the inherent powers of the president; (3) send a 
bill to Congress requesting seizure powers; or (4) invoke the 
procedures provided for by the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Seizure under Section 18 required an elaborate series of 
steps in which production orders were drawn up and served 
to selected companies, a process estimated to take weeks. 
Hence, with the strike deadline only a few days away, that 
option had to be ruled out. Sending a seizure bill to Congress 
could also take weeks and there was no guarantee that the 
conservative 82nd Congress would pass the bill. Relying on 
the Taft-Hartley Act would mean that the union, which had 
already voluntarily postponed its strike for three months, 
would be enjoined from striking for 80 days more. Truman felt 
that its use would be unfair to the union and, more practically, 
he feared that the union might ignore the injunction, going out 
on strike and stopping production. Philip Murray (McConnell, 
1960: 49), the steelworker union's boss, was to boast to his 
members during the dispute that "Taft-Hartley doesn't man- 
ufacture steel." The appointment of a fact-finding board, re- 
quired by the Taft-Hartley Act, would also tend to discredit 
the wage board (1960: 33). 
The only option that would guarantee continued steel produc- 
tion was seizure under the inherent powers of the president. 
Accordingly, on the evening of April 8, with the strike only 
hours away, Harry Truman went on the air to announce that 
he was seizing the nation's steel mills "by virtue of authority 
vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, and as President of the United States and 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United 
States" (United States Senate, 1952: 4). Secretary of Com- 
merce Charles Sawyer was placed in charge of the seized 
mills. 
It is not necessary to recount the famous six-to-three deci- 
sion of the Supreme Court on June 2 holding Truman's sei- 
zure of the steel mills unconstitutional. But it is relevant that 
upon learning of the Court's decision, the steelworkers im- 
mediately went out on strike. Truman once more considered, 
but rejected, using the Taft-Hartley procedure, again for the 
same reasons as before. He directed his assistant, John 
Steelman, to continue the attempt to mediate the dispute. 
Negotiations came to a stalemate, however, and the strike 
dragged on for weeks. On July 20, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Lovett announced that defense stockpiles of steel 
were running critically low. As he later recalled the situation 
that July, "We were running down our reserve. We were 
living on our seed corn. If the hostilities had broken out again 
or war in the Far East had spread, the United States would be 
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caught absolutely short" (McConnell, 1960: 18). Layoffs had 
already begun occurring in the automotive and other indus- 
tries (1 960: 27). 
On July 24, Truman called union and industry representatives 
to the White House and urged them to settle. Later that 
afternoon, they reached agreement. The wage package es- 
sentially called for the same terms as the earlier wage board 
recommendations. At the same time, the companies were 
granted an increase in prices. The 53-day strike, a prospect 
unthinkable to Truman only a few months earlier, had ended. 
Thus, the reason why Truman seized the steel mills on April 8 
was because it was his most rational course of action, given 
his objective of maintaining steel production. The other op- 
tions could not guarantee continued output. Even Taft-Hartley 
would not have guaranteed production and, furthermore, its 
use would have violated Truman's sense of fair play for the 
unions. 
Truman, admirer of the strong leadership of Polk, Lincoln, 
Wilson, and the Roosevelts, believed that the president 
should be an aggressive and forceful leader who did not shirk 
from taking whatever action necessary to preserve the secu- 
rity of the United States. Hence, on the night of April 8, he did 
not hesitate to take the almost unprecedented step of seizing 
an entire industry. The Supreme Court decision invalidating 
his seizure was beyond his control; forceful leadership could 
not affect that outcome. That the president should continue 
to be vigorous and innovative in the exercise of his powers 
during an emergency in spite of the Supreme Court decision, 
Truman made clear in his Memoirs: 
Whatever the six justices of the Supreme Court meant by their differing 
opinions about the constitutional powers of the President, he must always 
act in a national emergency It is not very realistic for the justices to say that 
comprehensive powers shall be available to the President only when a war 
has been declared or when the country has been invaded. We live in an age 
when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic notes . Nor 
can we separate the economic facts from the problems of defense and 
security . . . The President, who is Commander-in-Chief and who represents 
the interest of all the people, must be able to act at all times to meet any 
sudden threat to the nation's security A wise President will always work 
with Congress, but when Congress fails to act or is unable to act in a crisis, 
the President, under the Constitution, must use his powers to safeguard the 
nation (1956: 478). 
To a number of observers in 1 952, the steel seizure was the 
action of Harry Truman, the domestic politician par excel- 
lence. Many newspapers, business organizations, and Repub- 
lican congressmen claimed that the seizure was a high- 
handed attempt to intervene in an industrial dispute, the 
paying of a "political debt to labor," one steel executive 
described it (McConnell, 1960: 37). Though the steel dispute 
itself was bound up in the domestic politics of Big Labor 
versus Big Business and Democrats versus Republicans, and 
though Truman would not have been displeased if the union 
had been granted a generous wage increase, the seizure 
must be seen as an action taken primarily in response to 
international considerations. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES APPROACH 
The machinery for economic stabilization during the Korean 
War was a classic example of an elaborate bureaucratic 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
hierarchy. The Wage Stabilization Board (WSB) and the Office 
of Price Stabilization (OPS) were, in theory, responsible to the 
Economic Stabilization Agency, which in turn was subordinate 
to the Office of Defense Mobilization. The actions of all the 
economic stabilization agencies, in turn, were subject to re- 
view by the president. 
To handle the flood of wage petitions, the board devised a 
number of guidelines, so many that when the board was 
dissolved in the summer of 1952, there were 21 general 
wage regulations on the books (Brown, 1952: 11). Among the 
more important were WSB Regulation 6, which authorized 
employers to raise wages to 10 percent above the base 
period of January 1950, and Regulation 8, which permitted 
cost-of-living adjustments (1 952: 1 1). Regulation 13 con- 
trolled fringe-benefit policies (U.S. News and World Report, 
1952: 22). By virtue of its tripartite arrangement, the board 
took on a quasi-judicial form in which a sort of case law for 
the handling of disputes was created by the accretion of 
precedents (Brown, 1952: 1 1). Consequently, in recommend- 
ing a settlement for the steel dispute, the WSB acted accord- 
ing to its previous guidelines. The recommended wage in- 
creases were based for the most part on Regulation 8, allow- 
ing cost-of-living adjustments (U.S. News and World Report, 
1952: 24). 
The OPS, like the WSB, devised a set of guidelines for decid- 
ing on requests for price increases. Under its Industry Earn- 
ings Standard, the OPS allowed price increases for an indus- 
try only if that industry's earnings fell below 85 percent of its 
returns on net worth in the best years of 1 946 to 1 949 
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1953: 43). Therefore, when 
the companies claimed that they were in line for a $7.00 a ton 
price increase if they accepted the WSB recommendations, 
the OPS acted on the request according to its guidelines. 
Following the calculations of the OPS, the companies, under 
the Industry Earnings Standard, could not qualify for a price 
increase at all. During the 1947 to 1949 base period, which 
was the most profitable years the industry had experienced 
since World War 1, they achieved an average return of 18.5 
percent on net worth in 1 952-evidence of the prosperity 
brought about by the Korean War. This was returns before 
taxes, the OPS normal method of accounting in acting on 
price requests, but even allowing for the higher taxes in 1 952, 
the returns would still greatly exceed the base period returns 
(Arnall, 1952: 136). In an attempt to be flexible, the Office of 
Price Stabilization decided to grant the industry relief under 
the provisions of the so-called Capehart Amendment. Under 
this guideline, sellers were allowed to raise prices to recover 
cost increases incurred from the beginning of the Korean War 
through July 26, 1 951 (Enarson, 1 955: 58). The OPS first 
offered the industry about a $2.50 increase in March; its final 
offer on April 3, five days before the strike, was for $4.50, an 
increase of $2.75 under the Capehart Amendment, plus an 
additional $1 .75. 
Though nominally subordinate to the Economic Stabilization 
Agency and the Office of Defense Mobilization, the wage 
board was in effect quite independent of them. The process 
of regulating wages requires the cooperation and participation 
of both labor and industry. Through its tripartite form, the 
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WSB fulfilled that requirement. Therefore, the decision of a 
single official such as the ESA or ODM chief, or even the 
president, reversing a WSB decision would surely antagonize 
the board members who had labored so hard to reach a 
compromise. In December 1952, for example, Truman was to 
reject the WSB recommendations for the coal workers dis- 
pute, causing the resignation of 10 members and the col- 
lapse of the board (Council of Economic Advisers, 1953: 45). 
As ESA director Eric Johnston observed, a wage board com- 
posed only of public members "would not last long," and a 
single administrator "wouldn't last thirty days" (McConnell, 
1960: 8). In sum, WSB policies were irreversible; its 
superiors did not amend them. 
The Office of Price Stabilization, on the other hand, was not a 
board in the sense of the WSB, but only a regular administra- 
tive agency. Hence, its decisions were not as inviolable as 
those of the wage board. The energetic leadership of its 
chiefs, Michael DiSalle and later Ellis Arnall, however, won 
the bureaucratic in-fighting and thus the OPS gained virtual 
independence from its nominal superiors (Neustadt, 1960: 
14). 
There was virtually no cooperation or coordination between 
the two stabilization agencies. In part this was due to design. 
It was thought that the regulation of wages was best 
achieved through a special tripartite board. Furthermore, the 
board was to decide on wage requests according to its 
guidelines, without reference to the company's ability to pay. 
There were to be no consultations with the OPS about possi- 
ble price relief for the company. To allow consultation and 
coordination, administration officials felt, would invite collu- 
sion by industry and labor to get simultaneously substantial 
wage and price increases (Enarson, 1955: 56). If a company 
felt that a recent wage hike required raising prices, it could 
present its case and petition for a raise only after the addi- 
tional costs of the wage increase had been incurred. The OPS 
would then act on the request by determining whether its 
profit margin had fallen below the OPS minimum. 
The lack of cooperation between the two agencies was also 
due to the leadership of their chiefs. They vigorously asserted 
the independence of their agencies from superiors and each 
other and jealously guarded their respective prerogatives. As 
Neustadt described interagency relations, "One thing ... 
wage and price controllers had in common: they mistrusted 
those above them and were cool to one another (Neustadt, 
1960: 14). 
For the White House to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, 
however, would have required coordination of both the price 
and wage aspects of the issue. But it was OPS and WSB 
policy not to cooperate on wage and price stabilization. Thus, 
the White House was hindered in its attempts to negotiate a 
settlement, making the resulting impasse with the companies 
almost inevitable. 
Furthermore, for the White House to have made any long- 
range plans for handling the dispute would have necessitated 
communication between itself and the WSB. The board, 
however, made it a point not to divulge the probable outcome 
of its deliberations before the final recommendations were 
594/ASQ 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:54:11 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1952 Steel Seizure 
announced. In order to have some information with which to 
plan for future contingencies, several junior White House staff 
members approached wage board members to learn the 
probable terms of the forthcoming recommendations. They 
were rebuffed indignantly. Chairman Nathan Feinsinger of the 
WSB also failed to keep his superiors, Roger Putnam (ESA) 
and Wilson (ODM), informed of the direction of the board's 
thinking on the dispute (McConnell, 1960: 21). The WSB felt 
that its deliberations, like those of a judicial body, were al- 
most sacrosanct; their content could not be divulged, even to 
representatives of the president himself. 
The White House staff did not formulate a coherent plan for 
dealing with the dispute until early April. In other words, there 
was no set of routines or procedures for dealing with various 
contingencies, should they arise. In fact, seizure had been 
discussed as an option in the papers weeks before the White 
House had ever seriously considered it. 
The two chief figures on the White House staff dealing with 
the steel crisis were John Steelman, who alone held the title 
of assistant to the president, and Charles S. Murphy, special 
counsel to the president. Harold Enarson was an assistant to 
Steelman, while Richard Neustadt was Murphy's aide. The 
actual operation of the White House staff during the steel 
crisis was quite informal, with no regular assignments of task 
or responsibilities. The group of men who dealt with the crisis 
numbered only about 8 or 10 and they were burdened by the 
pressure of other tasks, ranging from Korea and the Mutual 
Security Program to the St. Lawrence Seaway project and 
emergency immigration measures. No one could be released 
to work exclusively with the steel question; such specializa- 
tion was considered a luxury, given the small staff size 
(McConnell, 1960: 31). 
On April 3, only five days before the strike, the White House 
staff, in conjunction with the Departments of Defense and 
Justice and the Atomic Energy Commission, finally began an 
intensive review of the options should negotiations break 
down. Lack of advance planning by the White House staff 
helped close out a number of options available to the presi- 
dent. Time had run out to send a seizure bill to Congress. 
Since it now was too late to undertake the necessary long, 
involved procedure of preparing and serving mandatory pro- 
duction orders, the Justice Department argued against sei- 
zure based on Section 18 of the Selective Service Act. Before 
the April 3 meeting, the Justice Department had not been 
consulted on a possible course of action (Stebbins, 1971: 13). 
There was little discussion of seizure on the basis of Title 11 of 
the Defense Production Act of 1950, providing for the requisi- 
tion of property through condemnation proceedings, which 
many observers felt would have been a more sound legal 
basis for such an action (McConnell, 1960: 32). Why there 
was not is not clear. 
Given the constraints of time-time had almost run out even 
for the use of the Taft-Hartley procedure-the Justice De- 
partment advised seizure based on the inherent powers of 
the president. Based on its files, which included opinions of 
former attorney generals now serving on the Supreme Court, 
it felt it to be a legitimate course of action that would be 
595/ASQ 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 21:54:11 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
upheld by the courts. Presidents from Lincoln to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had seized property in emergencies, claiming in- 
herent powers, and none of their actions had been invalidated 
by the courts. F.D.R. had even seized three defense plants 
before Pearl Harbor (Bradford, 1 967: 59). 
Though it was up to Truman to decide to seize the mills, the 
context in which he made the decision and, especially, the 
options that were available to him were partly the result of 
the routines or lack of routines and policies of organizations. 
The White House never checked the brief the Justice De- 
partment prepared for the ensuing court battles. Con- 
sequently, in late April Assistant Attorney General Holmes 
Baldridge, arguing for the government in district court, laid 
claim to unlimited presidential power, thus severely discredit- 
ing the administration's case before the public. Furthermore, 
the companies offered to rescind their request for an injunc- 
tion against the seizure in district court if the government 
promised not to raise wages during its operation of the mills. 
Baldridge, however, was strangely unable to contact anyone 
in the White House willing to discuss the matter and hence 
he had to decline the companies' offer (1967: 148, 158-160). 
THE GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS APPROACH 
In a Model Ill analysis, the decision to seize the steel mills is 
not the result of the detached, dispassionate analysis of a 
single problem-the Model I perspective-but a makeshift 
compromise among competing viewpoints within the ad- 
ministration concocted under the pressures of an approaching 
strike deadline. The decision to seize was only one among 
many in a dynamic stream of decisions that all affected the 
outcome of the crisis. 
A crucial factor influencing the final decision to seize the mills 
was the decision to resist the industry's demand for a price 
increase. On March 21, one day after the WSB had an- 
nounced its recommendations for the steel dispute, Office of 
Defense Mobilization Director Wilson flew to New York from 
Washington to confer with steel industry leaders about terms 
for settlement. The next day he returned to Washington and 
talked with Economic Stabilization Agency Director Roger 
Putnam and the new chief of the Office of Price Stabilization, 
Ellis Arnall, about the possibility of relaxing the OPS Industry 
Earnings Standard, so that at least part of the industry's price 
demand could be met. After the meeting, however, uniden- 
tified spokesmen at the OPS hinted at the resignation of 
Arnall and other OPS officials if the standard were revised 
(McConnell, 1960: 25). 
On Sunday, March 23, the day after his talks with Putnam and 
Arnall, Wilson flew to Key West to confer with the president 
at his vacation retreat. Wilson expressed his feeling that the 
WSB recommendations were too high. Truman, however, 
insisted that the wage board not be repudiated (1 960: 26). He 
did, however, authorize Wilson to get the companies to settle 
by offering them some price relief (Neustadt, 1960: 24-25). 
On arriving back in Washington on Monday, March 24, Wilson 
made an offhand remark to newsmen concerning the recent 
WSB recommendations: "'if the wage increases con- 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
templated under the USB's recommendations are put into 
effect, it would be a serious threat to our year-old effort to 
stabilize the economy" (McConnell, 1960: 26). This state- 
ment infuriated Wage Stabilization Board Chairman Feinsing- 
er, who claimed that Wilson must have been misquoted. 
Wilson, on the other hand, had felt betrayed by the WSB 
recommendations because Feinsinger had assured him a few 
weeks earlier that they would not be high (Enarson, 1955: 
57-58). Labor leaders were similarly outraged. Influential CIO 
officials immediately phoned Key West expressing their anger 
at Wilson, labor members of the WSB began making plans for 
resigning, and United Steelworkers of America President 
Philip Murray cancelled a planned meeting with Wilson to 
discuss settlement terms (McConnell, 1960: 26). 
Wilson, under fire from labor and the WSB, attempted to rally 
his stabilization officials around him. Claiming that he was 
acting under a mandate from the president, Wilson told Put- 
nam and Arnall that he was going to give the steel companies 
a price rise of $5.50 a ton in order to get them to settle. 
Putnam equivocated, but Arnall was adamant. Such an in- 
crease would make a mockery of OPS regulations, discredit- 
ing the whole stabilization machinery. He told Wilson that he 
would have to hear such instructions from the president him- 
self before he would cooperate in granting such a price rise 
(Enarson, 1955: 59). Accordingly, a meeting with Truman was 
scheduled for the next afternoon. That night Putnam decided 
that Wilson's plan was too generous to the companies and 
put himself in support of Arnall.4 
In the ensuing conference with the president, Wilson de- 
fended his plan, claiming that Truman had given him express 
authorization to grant whatever price increase was necessary 
to arrive at a settlement. Wilson, however, had already lost 
favor in the White House because of his earlier statement 
about the WSB proposals. Labor, a friend of Truman's which 
had loyally supported him in his 1948 campaign, had always 
mistrusted Wilson, considering him thoroughly probusiness in 
outlook.5 Furthermore, the day before the meeting, the indus- 
try had reneged on its offer to Wilson and was pressing for an 
even higher price increase while at the same time making no 
promise to settle with the union (Neustadt, 1960: 1 5). The 
position of Wilson, the czar of the whole mobilization pro- 
gram, was in effect being undercut from all sides. 
Arnall advanced the argument before Truman that giving into 
the companies would both discredit the whole price stabiliza- 
tion program and lead to a recurrence of inflation, steel being 
such a basic industry in the economy. Implicit in Arnall's 
argument was his threat of resignation. It was no empty 
threat; in July, after settling with the union, the companies 
were allowed a price rise well above OPS standards. As a 
result, OPS policies became discredited and Arnall quit a few 
weeks later (Newsweek, 1952: 65). 
Truman now had to choose between Wilson and Arnall. To 
support Wilson meant antagonizing labor and the WSB fur- 
ther, Arnall's resignation and the possible breakup of price 
control, and no guarantee of settlement with the companies 
(Enarson, 1955: 60). Truman therefore supported Arnall and 
Putnam. He told Wilson that he had never given him a man- 
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date to settle at any cost and criticized him for giving into the 
industry's demands for higher prices. Wilson, rebuked in front 
of two of his subordinates, felt that his usefulness to the 
administration had come to an end and resigned the next day, 
March 29.6 Thus, the decision to resist the industry's de- 
mands for a price increase was not so much an exercise in 
rational counterinflationary strategy by the president-the 
final settlement with the industry in July never produced the 
inflationary spiral they thought it would-as it was a reflection 
of the relative standing of Arnall and Putnam. 
On April 3 Arnall surprisingly raised his price offer to the 
companies, suggesting an increase of $4.50 a ton. To the 
White House staff, this offer was close to the earlier Wilson 
proposal and it revealed to them at last what Arnall's game 
plan had been. Apparently, he had felt that Wilson had been a 
poor negotiator, making his initial offer to the companies 
much too high. Arnall was playing the role of rigid adminis- 
trator, it seemed to them, to get better terms for settlement 
(McConnell, 1 960: 6). Thus, the administration's price offer, 
which in the Model 11 analysis appeared as an application of 
the OPS Industry Earnings Standard, becomes, under the 
Model Ill perspective, part of a bargaining strategy. 
Immediately upon the resignation of Wilson, Truman ap- 
pointed Steelman as head of the ODM. Steelman, from his 
extensive experience in labor mediation-he served with the 
United States Mediation Service in the early 1 940s-believed 
in the axiom of industrial relations that last minute settle- 
ments are always the rule and he felt that the steel dispute 
would be no different. He was optimistic all the way up to the 
day of seizure. Not all the White House staff members shared 
his optimism, but he was now both ODM chief and the 
assistant to the president and was devoting all his attention to 
the steel crisis (1 960: 27-28). 
Truman delegated much of the coordination of White House 
policy during the dispute to Steelman. Ever since his ap- 
pointment as assistant to the president he had had an infor- 
mal mandate from Truman to act for the president in coor- 
dinating domestic operations of the government. Only he and 
Special Counsel Charles S. Murphy, whose duties centered 
on the drafting of the administration's legislative proposals 
and the preparation of executive orders, could call a meeting 
in the president's name. It was Steelman to whom Truman 
invariably turned for advice on major labor disputes. Most 
participants in the steel dispute regarded him as the person 
who was advising and informing the president on the matter 
(1 960: 22-23). By virtue of his sway with Truman, business 
and labor leaders always attempted to deal directly with him 
on industrial relations matters, bypassing Secretary of Labor 
Maurice Tobin. Secretary Tobin, whose office traditionally rep- 
resented the White House in industrial disputes, thus was not 
to play an important role in the steel crisis (1960: 27). The 
influence of the Council of Economic Advisers, under Leon 
Keyserling, had also been on the wane since its dispute with 
Truman over fiscal policy in the fall of 1951 (Bernstein, 1967: 
121). Its only apparent contribution in the dispute was a 
report in November 1951 to the president advising him that 
the steel industry could absorb "any remotely reasonable 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
wage increase" and urging him to resist any policy of simul- 
taneous wage and price increases (McConnell, 1960: 15). 
Due to Steelman's optimistic prognosis, no plans were made 
until early April for alternative courses of action in case 
negotiations broke down. Truman was receptive to such op- 
timism, being harried by the pressure of events in his last 
year at the White House, from the stalemate in Korea and the 
attacks of Joseph McCarthy to corruption in his own ad- 
ministration. The last thing he wanted was a steel strike. 
On April 3, however, the impending strike deadline, only five 
days away, forced the White House to act; representatives of 
the Justice and Defense Departments and the Atomic Energy 
Commission were summoned to make an intensive review of 
the options. 
The option of sending a seizure bill to Congress was ruled out 
because of lack of time and also because there was no 
guarantee that Congress would pass it. Seizure under Section 
18 of the Selective Service Act was eliminated because the 
Justice Department said it did not have enough time to pre- 
pare the necessary orders. Taft-Hartley was also rejected 
because of the constraints of time and because it would 
antagonize labor. Enarson, Steelman's assistant, was the only 
prominent figure to advocate Taft-Hartley use during the dis- 
pute (Stebbins, 1 971: 1 6). 
The option of permitting the strike to continue was never 
seriously considered. It was Secretary of Defense Lovett's 
opinion that a loss of steel production could endanger Ameri- 
ca's fighting capabilities and his warnings were apparently 
taken at face value. In order to keep the budget levels down, 
the administration had taken the risk of slowing down or 
stretching out the mobilization program. Lovett felt that a 
stoppage of steel production would only increase the risk 
they had taken with the stretch-out program. He did not, 
however, make a strong public statement on the danger until 
July 20, well into the actual strike. As he later explained, he 
felt any public statement by him would have little force until 
he could actually document the shortage. When he spoke on 
July 20, the supply of essential materials had dropped below 
the critical 90-day line, the point where there was less than a 
90-day supply of certain items. His warning shocked the 
public and helped prompt the companies and the union into 
settling four days later (McConnell, 1 960: 51). 
Seizure under the inherent powers of the president appeared 
to be the only option remaining. Truman himself believed that 
such an action was of questionable legality (Stebbins, 1971: 
13). In fact, Truman has been criticized for having had too 
cavalier an attitude toward Constitutional niceties (1 971 :13). 
Steelman, still optimistic and believing that negotiations 
would become serious just before the deadline, counseled 
delay and thus Truman took no action on April 3 (Enarson, 
1955: 55). Steelman and Feinsinger continued their talks with 
the industry in New York, but the companies refused to 
budge from their demands. 
By Saturday, April 5, time had run out even to use the Taft- 
Hartley injunction to stop the strike; it would take four or five 
days to convene the necessary board of inquiry. The White 
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House staff thus was forced to begin making plans for sei- 
zure. It was decided that the president would make a speech 
on Sunday night to explain how the steel companies were 
demanding unreasonable price increases, in light of the 
reasonable recommendations of the WSB, and then threaten 
extraordinary action if the parties did not settle their dispute 
through negotiation. It was hoped that this speech would 
inform the public of the industry's intransigence and prepare 
it for the more drastic step of seizure on Tuesday, if it should 
occur. The seizure speech itself would be one of a more 
neutral and magisterial character (McConnell, 1960: 33). 
On Sunday morning, April 6, Steelman got the president's 
speech postponed until Monday. Bargaining with the com- 
panies, about which he was still optimistic, would recom- 
mence on Monday and he felt that the speech, with its 
partisan attack on the industry's position on prices, would 
only hinder the talks. Furthermore, United States Steel Com- 
pany President Benjamin Fairless had already scheduled a 
speech for Sunday evening and Steelman thought that a 
presidential speech on the same night would give the appear- 
ance of a debate, to the detriment of the president (1960: 
34). 
On Monday, Feinsinger called from New York to ask for a 
further delay of the president's speech. He detected what he 
thought was a conciliatory attitude on the part of the industry 
negotiators that justified continued optimism (1 960: 34). By 
postponing his Monday speech, however, Truman in effect 
relinquished his opportunity to make two speeches on the 
crisis, for there was no time left. 
By Tuesday morning, with the strike scheduled for twelve 
o'clock that evening, it was clear to the White House that 
action could not be postponed any longer. White House staff 
members began rewriting the president's seizure speech, 
having to combine elements of both the original partisan 
speech with the announcement of the seizure itself. When 
finally delivered that evening, the speech reflected the dif- 
ficulties in trying to patch together two different speeches. 
The president spoke briefly at the beginning of the danger to 
the troops in Korea resulting from a loss of steel, but then, for 
the bulk of the speech, concentrated on attacking the steel 
companies. Instead of being lofty and majesterial, the speech 
was argumentative and contentious. The international implica- 
tions of the crisis facing the nation were lost to the public; 
they only seemed to regard it as a case of a president med- 
dling in an industrial dispute (Stebbins, 1971: 7). 
At 3 P.M. on Tuesday, April 8, Truman convened a meeting of 
his Defense Mobilization Board, consisting of his major advis- 
ers concerned with the defense production effort. In his 
Memoirs, Truman dwells on how important this meeting was 
in leading him to decide to seize the mills. He recalled that his 
principal advisers, such as Secretary of Defense Lovett, Sec- 
retary of Commerce Sawyer, and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, briefed him on the domestic and international dan- 
gers of a steel strike. These warnings, Truman notes, "pre- 
sented a very serious picture.... I had to act to prevent the 
stoppage of steel production which would imperil the nation" 
(1956: 470). 
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1952 Steel Seizure 
His meeting, however, only ratified what Truman and the 
White House staff had decided on earlier. Lovett and a few 
others brought up the question of invoking Taft-Hartley but, 
as McConnell reported, "since they gained the impression 
that this matter had already been decided, they did not press 
the point" (McConnell, 1 960: 35). Given that the strike was 
only nine hours away, there was little that the members of 
the Defense Mobilization Board could do but endorse the 
seizure decision. 
Truman was plagued by lack of influence over the participants 
in the dispute right up until the actual seizure announcement 
itself. It had been planned that the president in his speech 
that evening was to both announce the seizure and the im-- 
plementation of only the first step of the Taft-Hartley proce- 
dure, the appointment of a board of inquiry. It was hoped that 
this would assuage those who were clamoring for use of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Through the board of inquiry, the refusal of 
the industry to compromise on prices and the union's volun- 
tary delay of its strike could be brought to the public's atten- 
tion. With the public thus informed about the facts of the 
dispute, the injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act would not 
have to be implemented. At 7 P.M. a White House staff 
member telephoned an official of the steelworkers to ask 
about possible reaction to the convening of a Taft-Hartley 
board. He was told a wildcate strike would certainly result and 
the White House then dropped the plan (1960: 35). 
Even after the seizure decision, Truman was plagued by dis- 
sension over steel dispute policy among members of his 
administration. Secretary of Commerce Sawyer, who spoke 
for business in the cabinet, had never been enthusiastic 
either about the seizure or his role as administrator of the 
mills. Consequently, when Truman asked him to grant a par- 
tial wage increase to the steelworkers as part of a White 
House plan to induce the companies and the union to settle, 
Sawyer refused to act, threatening to resign if forced to 
implement the plan. After three weeks of White House pres- 
sure, Sawyer finally agreed to act, but only on the condition 
that the public record would show that his department acted 
on the orders of others (Neustadt, 1960: 23). 
CONCLUSION 
This study has revealed not merely the strengths but also the 
weaknesses of the Allison approach. While the seizure deci- 
sion was examined from three different perspectives, three 
distinct explanations do not appear to have been generated. 
In many respects the explanation of Model 11 seems indistin- 
guishable from that of Model 111. Organizational routines ex- 
plain only a part of the organization's impact on a decisional 
outcome. Aggressive politicking by an agency, especially the 
forcefulness of its chiefs in their dealings with other organiza- 
tions, Model Ill variables, play an equally important explana- 
tory role in Model 11 by determining the degree of influence 
the organization's routines will have on the decision. For 
example, the importance of the OPS Industry Earnings Stan- 
dard in forcing a strike and eventual seizure decision seems 
due, to a significant extent, to the OPS's independence from 
its superior agencies, the ESA, the 0DM, and the White 
House-an independence won through the bureaucratic in- 
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fighting of its chiefs. Possibly a more aggressive White House 
staff (a la Nixon's White House staff of Haldeman, Erlichman, 
and others), or a more aggressive ESA or ODM, could have 
essentially neutralized the effect of the OPS or any of its 
Industry Earnings Standards-again, a Model Ill explanation. 
To cite another example, the OPS's use of the Capehard 
Amendment loophole to circumvent the application of its In- 
dustry Earnings Standard was an act of compromise on the 
part of a player in a bargaining game-again, Model Ill-rather 
than that of an organizational monolith constrained by its past 
behavior. Hence, the explanation of the decision with Model 11 
seems similar to that with Model 111, only that Model 11 talks 
about bureaucratic actors whose routines are a good predictor 
of their behavior in the bargaining game. There is a distinct 
difference between explaining behavior as the result of a 
bargaining game and as the product of previous organizational 
routines. Allison's Model 11 explanation, however, involves 
more than just organizational routines. 
In his own Model 11 case study in Essence of Decision, Allison 
had problems in differentiating the Model 11 from the Model Ill 
explanation. For instance, he emphasized the importance of 
the 1 0-day delay between the decision by Washington to 
approve U-2 reconnaissance over-flights of Cuba and the first 
U-2 mission. Is this crucial delay the result of previous organi- 
zational routines? No, according to Allison (1971: 123), it is 
the result of infighting between the State Department, the Air 
Force, and the CIA over strategy and agency jurisdictions. 
When, in conjunction with the blockade of Cuba, the navy 
initiated a massive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercise in 
the Atlantic, Allison (1971: 138) explained it not as naval 
standard operating procedure, but as an attempt by the navy 
to garner more money for ASW by impressing civilian De- 
fense Department officials with the program's performance.7 
The work on which Allison bases his Model 11, A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm by Cyert and March (1963), rests on a 
conception of an organization as a coalition of members who 
bargain over organizational decisions.8 
The perspective of Model 1, however, produced an explana- 
tion decidedly different from that of Model 11 or 111. Model I 
focused on the stoppage of steel production as a single, 
discrete problem and investigated the options available and 
their consequences, to yield an explanation of the seizure as 
the most rational course of action, given Truman's goal of 
maintaining steel production. In sum, Allison's three perspec- 
tives generate only two conceptually distinct explanations- 
Model I versus Models 11 and Ill-or at best, two-and-a-half. 
Thus, it seems there are situations in which Models 11 and Ill 
can be blended (as Allison himself suggested) but, in which 
they are best blended. 
The differences in the resulting explanations are due not only 
to units of analysis but to differences in level of analysis. As 
Allison pointed out, Models 11 and Ill deal with aggregates, 
while Model I focuses on only a single actor. Consequently, 
the explanations of the organizational processes and gov- 
ernmental politics paradigms must be by nature more in- 
volved and complex, with less rigor and consistency. For 
deductive explanation, Model 1, with its assumption of ration- 
ality, can not be matched in terms of rigor and elegance.9 
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Moreover, the explanations of Models 11 and III are at a 
comparatively lower level. Model 11 achieves a measure of 
precision with ts explanation in terms of organizational 
routines at period t-1, but, as this study suggests, an organi- 
zation's routines account for only a portion of its effect on a 
result. The explanation of Model Ill is the weakest of the 
three; its method of explanation is in essence only a recount- 
ing of the bargaining game. It is not clear what causes a 
player to have more influence than another. Further, such a 
method of explanation could easily become idiosyncratic, 
making the construction of generally applicable models dif- 
ficult. Its treatment of the decisional process is a more realis- 
tic one but, as in most realistic theories of social processes, it 
is at the expense of scientific rigor. 
As Allison emphasized, these three models should not be 
considered the only approaches; there are other possible 
models, especially those of a more psychological character. 
The group dynamics approach developed by Janis (1972) in 
his Victims of Groupthink could be yet another insightful 
method of analyzing the seizures. 
Another conceptual approach to the steel seizure would be 
the one developed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1 962) in 
"Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of Interna- 
tional Affairs." This framework, however, is designed only to 
answer the question of how the decision was made. The 
question why is more significant to ask. In addition, answer- 
ing the question why necessarily involves answering the 
question how. 
In spite of its weaknesses, the Allison approach is provocative 
in that it is still useful in explaining political decisions. Reality 
is many-faced; to explain it, it is necessary to break it down 
into its component parts. The Allison approach makes the 
necessary first step in this process by focusing on three 
different actors-the rational unitary actor, the organization, 
and the bureaucratic game player-and by asking three sys- 
tematic sets of questions about them. 
The Allison approach can thus be used to explain a wide array 
of presidential decisions, as, for example, Nixon's decision to 
impose wage-price controls in August 1971. From a Model I 
perspective, it is an action maximizing Nixon's objective of 
preventing continued inflation and its damaging effects politi- 
cally. A Model 11 analysis might deal with the economic fore- 
casts of the Labor and Commerce Departments. A Model III 
explanation might focus on the relative influence of John 
Connally, George Schultz, John Erlichman, and others. Such 
an approach might not be applicable to all presidential deci- 
sions, however. For example, President Kennedy's decision 
to resist United States Steel's price increase was made in- 
stantaneously upon learning of the price hike. Much of the 
government's activity during the crisis consisted of presiden- 
tial and cabinet officials' harangues against United States 
Steel. The only governmental agency to get significantly in- 
volved in the crisis was the Justice Department. The whole 
incident was over in 72 hours. Consequently, studying various 
organizational processes or bureaucratic politics during the 
crisis might be a trivial exercise, yielding little of interest. 
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One of the most striking aspects of the 1 952 steel dispute 
was how little Truman was able to influence events. Though 
nominally their superior, Truman was for the most part unable 
to direct the actions of the stabilization agencies. After Tru- 
man ordered Secretary Sawyer to implement the wage--price 
plan, Sawyer simply sat on his hands. Though the President 
asked Congress for legislative assistance in the crisis, it did 
nothing. In spite of Truman's pleas that their strike would 
endanger the lives of the troops, the companies and the 
steelworkers failed to come to terms. 
The limitations of the president's power over domestic policy, 
as compared with his influence over foreign policy, has been 
the object of some study by political scientists. There is 
something in the nature of foreign policy leadership that 
makes Congress, various agencies, and even the public more 
amenable to carrying out the president's wishes. For one 
thing, the general public is less informed on foreign issues 
than on domestic ones. People seem more familiar with tax 
hikes, school integration policies, or wage and price controls 
and thus are more inclined to resist presidential policies in 
such areas. Presidential decisions in foreign affairs, further- 
more, often involve the very existence of the nation and 
hence, the public, various agencies, and Congress feel com- 
pelled to follow his leadership.10 Mueller (1 973), for example, 
in War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, reported a positive 
correlation between dramatic presidential actions in interna- 
tional affairs and his popularity in the polls. Furthermore, in 
foreign affairs, the president acts often as commander-in- 
chief, certainly a more majestic role than chief price controller 
or chief wage regulator. 
Chong-do Hah is a professor and chairman of the De- 
partment of Government at Lawrence University. Robert 
M. Lindquist is a student at the University of Texas Law 
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